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I Comment I
Marital Status Discrimination In the
Workplace: The Need for Title VII




Over 40 years ago, states began enacting anti-discrimination laws
aimed at protecting individuals from unlawful discrimination based on
marital status. Marital status discrimination is often implicated by em-
ployers' no-spouse or antinepotism policies. Claims of marital status
discrimination can also arise from an employer taking adverse action
against a prospective or current employee solely because the mployee is
married, unmarried, or going through a divorce. Without federal guid-
ance on marital status discrimination, states treat claims quite differently
and take varied stances on the proper scope of marital status protection.
Some states apply broad coverage to marital status discrimination, while
other states adopt a narrow approach. This unpredictability among the
states affects both employers and employees, and it has resulted in un-
clear expectations as to marital status discrimination law.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity, 2016.
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This Comment will discuss the current law and varied interpreta-
tions of marital status discrimination among the states and the need for
federal protection of marital status discrimination. This Comment will
propose that Congress amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
include marital status as a proscribed basis for unlawful discrimination
by employers. A Title VII amendment would provide a clear definition
of the scope of marital status protection and promote uniformity among
the states to ensure that employer policies comply with marital status
discrimination laws and protect employees from unlawful discrimination
based on marital status.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an unmarried couple works together for the same compa-
ny-a situation not all that uncommon in the United States.' The com-
pany has an antinepotism policy, which prohibits spouses employed by
the company from working closely together or supervising one another.
The couple becomes engaged and is warned by human resources that up-
on marriage, one employee will have to transfer departments or office
locations, or be forced to resign to comply with the company's antinepo-
tism policy. This problem is exacerbated when the company does not
have other office locations, or when switching departments would not
prevent the couple from working closely together. The only options
would be for one individual to resign or face being fired.
Enforcing an antinepotism policy is not the only example of an ad-
2
verse employer action that implicates marital status discrimination.
More egregious claims for marital status discrimination often arise. For
example, an individual terminated from his job after their employer dis-
covered unfavorable information about the individual's wife constitutes
marital status discrimination in some states.3 Perhaps the individual's
wife was seeking nomination for a public office and actively expressed
her beliefs and political views, which were not in line with those of the
employer. The employer then decided that it was necessary to fire the
individual in order to preserve the employer's own values.
These examples represent several adverse employer actions based
on marital status.4 Individuals in situations similar to these, however,
currently have no federal protection against marital status discrimina-
tion.' While the Civil Rights Act of 19646 was enacted to protect indi-
viduals from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin,7 Congress has neglected to include additional bases for
1. See Saily M. Avelenda, Love and Marriage in the American Workplace: Why
No-Spouse Policies Don't Work, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 691, 697 * 1998) (discussing
how the increasing number of women in the workplace since the 1970s has resulted in
more couples meeting at work). In a study done in the late 1990s, approximately 80% of
people have either observed or have been in a relationship with a fellow employee. Jen-
nifer Dean, Employer Regulation of Employee Personal Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REV.
1051, 1073-74 (1996).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See, e.g., Taylor v. LSI Corp. of Am., 796 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Minn. 2011).
4. See infra Part H.A.
5. Marital status discrimination is federally recognized as an unlawful employer
practice, applicable only to federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(E) (2012).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012).
7. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
2016]
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unlawful discrimination. Absent federal coverage addressing discrimi-
natory trends that have emerged in the last 50 years, many states have
enacted legislation that proscribes additional forms of discrimination, in-
cluding prohibiting discrimination based on marital status.9 Without fed-
eral guidance on the scope of marital status, however, states disagree
over how to interpret and apply the law.10
Some states do not provide any protection for discrimination based
on marital status, and thus, there will be no redress for the employer's
action."1 However, even if an employee lives in a state that prohibits
marital status discrimination, the claim likely will still fail because of the
narrow protection some states apply to marital status discrimination.
12
The varied, and sometimes limited, state protection for marital status dis-
crimination exemplifies the need for uniform federal protection against
such discrimination.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of marital status
discrimination, beginning with how claims for marital status discrimina-
tion usually arise.13 Part II will also describe the current and varying ap-
proaches state laws take in protecting employees from marital status dis-
crimination.14 Part III will analyze specific issues that arise when states
have inconsistent interpretations of an area of the law. Additionally, Part
III will discuss the need for federal guidance to ensure a uniform ap-
proach.15 Finally, Part III will culminate with a recommendation that
Congress amend Title VII to include marital status as a proscribed basis
for discrimination.16  Part IV of this Comment will conclude with a
summary of the topics discussed throughout.
17
8. Amendments have been made to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including protec-
tion against discrimination based on age, disabilities, and pregnancy. See, e.g., id
§ 2000(e)(k) (amending Title VII to include discrimination based on pregnancy or child-
birth as unlawful sex-based discrimination).
9. Many states have also provided protection against discrimination based on sexu-
al orientation and political affiliation, but this Comment will focus solely on discrimina-
tion based on marital status.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. An employee may, of course, seek recovery by claiming discrimination under a
different theory. See infra Part II.A. 1.
12. See infra Part ll.C.1.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part IV.
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II. THE PAST AND PRESENT STATE OF MARITAL STATUS
DISCRIMINATION LAW FEDERALLY AND AMONG THE STATES
A. Defining Marital Status Discrimination and the History of Marital
Status Discrimination Claims
Marital status discrimination is a relatively young and developing
area in employment discrimination law.18 Discrimination based on mari-
tal status is typically understood to mean discrimination based on "as-
sumed characteristics,"'19 or stereotypes of individuals based on their sta-
tus as married, single, or divorced.2 ° In the employment context, marital
status discrimination occurs when certain rights are granted or denied to
an individual in the workplace because of his or her marital status.21 A
claim for marital status discrimination can stem from an adverse em-
ployment action made during the hiring process, throughout the course
23 24of employment, or upon termination of the employee.
Marital status discrimination claims most commonly challenge em-
ployers' antinepotism or no-spouse rules, usually under state civil rights
25statutes. Antinepotism rules traditionally barred immediate family
members from working for the same company to avoid problems such as
favoritism, undeserved rewards, or unfair employment decisions related
to the hiring or promoting process.26 By the 1970s, when the number of
18. Timothy D. Chandler et al., Spouses Need Not Apply: The Legality of Antinepo-
tism and No-Spouse Rules, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 31, 34 (2002) (stating that marital sta-
tus based legal challenges began to appear in courts when more women entered the work-
force in the 1970s and 1980s).
19. See Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 591, 592
(2011) (discussing how discriminatory action based on a particular characteristic is a re-
sult of "unvoiced beliefs, assumptions, and associations").
20. See Courtland C. Merrill & Cory D. Olson, Individual In The Class Marital Sta-
tus Discrimination in Employment, 68-AUG BENCH & B. MiNN. 18, 18 (2011).
21. See Mary Curlew & Julie Weber, Opportunities For Policy Leadership on Mari-




22. See Pre-Employment Inquiries and Marital Status, U.S. EEOC,
http://eeoc.gov/laws/ practices/inquiriesmarital_status.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2014)
(discussing interview questions that are inappropriate for an employer to ask because of
the questions' relevance to marital status).
23. See River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Human Rights Comm'n, 597
N.E.2d 842, 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
24. See Aase v. Wapiti Meadows Cmty., 832 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Minn. Ct. App.
2013).
25. Lee R. Russ, What Constitutes Employment Discrimination on Basis of "Marital
Status " For Purposes ofState Civil Rights Laws, 44 A.L.R. 4th 1044 § 1 (1986).
26. See Joan G. Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The Uneasy Case for Antinepotism
Rules, 62 B.U. L. REv. 75, 75-77 (1982).
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women entering the workforce dramatically increased,27 employers be-
gan to include spouses within the scope of their antinepotism policies.28
Employers also commonly created an additional policy that expressly
forbid spouses from working for the same employer, also known as no-
spouse rules.29
Less commonly litigated claims for marital status discrimination in-
volve adverse employment actions based solely on the employee's mari-
tal status.30 Examples of such claims include: discharging an employee
because the employee is going through a divorce,31 firing an unmarried
employee because he or she is living with his or her romantic partner,32
or terminating an employment relationship because an employee's
spouse is working for a competitor.33
Challenges to employer policies or actions claiming marital status
discrimination are often unsuccessful,34 but the likelihood of success in-
creases dramatically when the claim is brought in state court.35 One
study, for example, found that 49 percent of plaintiffs claiming marital
status discrimination are successful in state court, compared to only 9
percent in federal court.36 The discrepancy in the likelihood for success
depending on whether the claim is brought in state or federal court is
likely due to state legislation prohibiting marital status discrimination,
and the lack of similar legislation at the federal level.37
More importantly, the outcome of marital status discrimination
claims is dependent on whether the claimant's state recognizes marital
status discrimination claims,38 and if so, how the state defines "marital
status. 39 In a state that broadly defines the term, all types of marital sta-
27. Id. at 77 n.17 (stating that by 1974, 36 million women were employed); Chandler
et al., supra note 18, at 32-33 (discussing that the increase of women in the workforce is
due to trends such as men's decreased wages and an increase in college-educated wom-
en).
28. See Wexler, supra note 26, at 77-78.
29. See id.
30. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for Ti-
tle VII Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2000).
31. Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, No. A-1717-12T3, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 1548, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
32. Johnson v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
33. Aase v. Wapiti Meadows Cmty., 832 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
34. Chandler et al., supra note 18, at 44 (stating that only 29% of marital status dis-




38. See Porter, supra note 30, at 16.
39. See id. at 18-19.
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tus discrimination claims will likely have a chance of success.40 If a state
interprets "marital status" narrowly, however, the likelihood of recovery
greatly diminishes due to the limited instances in which the narrow inter-
pretation states will recognize marital status discrimination.41 Therefore,
the scope of coverage and the current interpretation a state affords to
marital status protection has proven to be the determining factor in the
success of a marital status discrimination claim.
B. The Current State of Marital Status Discrimination
1. Federal Law
Notable federal legislation governing employment discrimination is
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 which promotes equal em-
ployment opportunities and prohibits discriminatory employment prac-
tices.43 Specifically, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to hire,
refuse to hire, or terminate an employee based on the individual's "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 44 Marital status is, however, not
a protected category under Title VII.
45
Because Title VII lacks explicit protection against marital status
discrimination, many litigants who may have such a claim in state court
often choose to bring an alternative claim under Title VII in federal
court.46 For instance, claimants will commonly allege sex-based discrim-
ination under Title VII, 47 particularly if the adverse action involves a no-
spouse rule.48 Claims brought under Title VII may nevertheless fail due
to the high standard required to prove discrimination when the adverse
employer practice is not facially discriminatory.49 Discrimination claims
under Title VII can be brought alleging either disparate treatment or dis-
40. See Chandler et al., supra note 18, at 45 (stating that 67% of claims are success-
ful when the court broadly defines marital status).
41. Id. (stating that 38% of marital status discrimination claims fail when the court
narrowly interprets marital status).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012).
43. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
45. Id. Marital status discrimination is federally recognized as an unlawful employer
practice, applicable only to federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(E) (2012).
46. See Porter, supra note 30, at 7 (indicating that the only feasible option for many
litigants claiming marital status discrimination is to allege sex-based discrimination under
Title VII).
47. Id.
48. There is evidence that no-spouse rules are more likely to affect women. See
Wexler, supra note 26, at 92. Thus, a woman may have success in alleging sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII, rather than marital status discrimination under the appropriate
state statute. See Chandler et al., supra note 18, at 35, 47.
49. Id. at 44-47.
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parate impact.50 Disparate treatment requires that the employer treat an
individual differently than others and that the policy or adverse action be
discriminatory on its face,51 creating an inference of discrimination.
However, employment policies that expressly communicate the employ-
er's discriminatory intent are relatively rare.3
Alternatively, disparate impact claims involve practices that are
"fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,"54 meaning that a policy or
practice is facially neutral, yet has a discriminatory effect when en-
forced5  For example, the disparate impact claim in the landmark U.S.
Supreme Court case Griggs v. Duke Power Co.56 involved a hiring policy
requiring applicants to hold a high school diploma or obtain a particular
score on an aptitude test. 7 The Court reasoned that the particular policy,
while facially neutral, had a disparate impact on African-American ap-
plicants and served to disqualify African-Americans at a substantially
higher rate than Caucasian applicants.8
A plaintiff asserting disparate impact must prove more than a mere
inference of discrimination.5 9 Rather, the plaintiff is required to show
that the employer's action had a significant discriminatory impact on a
protected group of individuals.60 The plaintiff has the initial burden of
proof and must introduce statistical evidence that demonstrates a dispro-
portionate adverse effect, which is often a difficult task to accomplish.61
The employer then has an opportunity to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse action.62 The plaintiff can rebut the
employer's proffered reason, but rebuttal requires additional evidence.63
50. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977).
51. An example of employer action that is discriminatory on its face is a policy that
contains language explicitly discriminating on the basis of a Title VII protected ground.
See Sheryl Rosensky Miller, From the Inception to the Aftermath of International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Achieving its Potential to Advance Women's Employ-
ment Rights, 43 CATH. U.L. REv. 227, 229 (1993) (describing that a facially discriminato-
ry policy directly violates Title VII's "prohibitions against gender discrimination because
the measures themselves contain language explicitly discriminating on the basis of gen-
der").
52. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1972).
53. See Anna Giattina, Challenging No-Spouse Employment Policies As Marital Sta-
tus Discrimination: A Balancing Approach, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1111, 1115 (1987).
54. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
55. See id. at432.
56. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
57. Id. at 427-28.
58. Id at 426.
59. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. Sept. 1981).
60. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
61. Wexler, supra note 26, at 102-03.
62. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
63. Id. at 255.
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Due to the difficult burden plaintiffs face while litigating a discrimina-
tion claim under federal law, and the lack of Title VII marital status pro-
tection, plaintiffs often resort to state law to claim marital status discrim-
ination.
2. State Law
Because federal legislation does not recognize marital status as a
protected category for unlawful discrimination, litigants are often forced
to seek redress outside the federal forum.64 States have taken the lead in
enacting legislation aimed at combatting discrimination based on marital
status. 65 Since the 1970s, at least 20 states and the District of Columbia
have amended their respective civil rights statutes to add marital status as
a basis for a potential unlawful discrimination claim.66
State legislatures often describe marital status discrimination provi-
sions as aiming to prevent "arbitrary classifications" related to mar-
riage.67 Specifically, including marital status in anti-discrimination stat-
utes aims to protect the fundamental right individuals have in their
marital relationships.68 Marital status protection also attempts to prevent
employer interference in "one of the most personal decisions an individ-
ual makes-whether to marry, and to remain married.,
69
Many state civil rights statutes are worded similarly to one another,
stating that an employer may not refuse to hire, discharge, or discrimi-
nate against an individual because of religion, race, color, national origin,
sex, or marital status.7° Many states, however, have failed to both defme
the term "marital status" and explain what constitutes marital status dis-
64. See Porter, supra note 30, at 7.
65. See Stephen B. Humphress, State Protection Against Marital Status Discrimina-
tion By Employers, 31 U. LOuIsVILLE J. FAM. L. 919, 920 (1992) (stating that many states
enact more comprehensive anti-discrimination laws than federal law provides).
66. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220 (West 2014); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12921
(West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19, § 711
(West 2014); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-1402.11 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West
2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (West 2014); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102 (West
2014); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 20-606 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.2202 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. §
49-2-303 (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (West 2014); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
354-A:7 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-1 (West 2014); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296
(McKinney 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. §
659A.030 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (West 2014); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.180 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 2014).
67. Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979).
68. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
69. Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, No. A-1717-12T3, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 1548, at *18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
70. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202; HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-2.
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crimination.7" In addition, most states have neglected to delineate the in-
tended scope of marital status protection.72
Currently, only 7 out of the 21 states that include marital status as
an unlawful basis for discrimination define the statutory term "marital
status. 73 States that have defined the term differ on whether marital sta-
tus is the condition of being married or unmarried,74 or if the term also
includes being divorced, separated, or widowed.75 Defining and inter-
preting the appropriate scope of marital status for purposes of a discrimi-
nation claim is left to state courts, particularly in states whose legisla-
tures do not provide any guidance as to the term's breadth.76
C. State Courts' Differing Interpretations of the Term "Marital Status"
Several states have narrowly interpreted the term "marital status" to
refer only to the employee's status as married or unmarried.77 Further,
while still interpreting marital status narrowly, some states choose to also
protect individuals who are separated, divorced, or widowed.78 Other
states have adopted a broad interpretation of marital status to combat ad-
verse employer actions based on the identity, actions, occupation, and
beliefs of an individual's spouse.7 9
1. Narrow Interpretation
Some of the states8° that have narrowly interpreted the scope of
marital status protection include Michigan,81 New Jersey,82 and New
71. See Giattina, supra note 53, at 1116 (stating that state legislatures have not "suf-
ficiently clarified" their intent with respect to marital status discrimination).
72. Id.
73. See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.02(17)(West 2014); RAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1;
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(24)(West
2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(12) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
49.60.040(17) (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(12) (West 2014).
74. See Aw. REV. STAT. § 378-1; NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(12).
75. See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.02(17); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(17); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(12).
76. Giattina, supra note 53, at 1116 (discussing how state courts have the burden of
interpreting marital status until state legislatures provide more guidance).
77. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1102(12); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-1 (West 2014); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296
(McKinney 2014).
78. See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.02(17); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(J);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(17); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(12).
79. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 378-2; MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 363.03; MONT. CODE ANN. §
49-2-303 (West 2014).
80. Illinois, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin
narrowly interpret marital status.
81. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 390 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Mich.
1986); Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Mich. 1984).
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York.83 Courts adopting a narrow definition of marital status reason that
the term should be afforded its plain meaning within the anti-
discrimination statute, referring only to the "condition enjoyed by an in-
dividual by reason of... having participated or failed to participate in a
marriage.8 4
In other words, in these states, marital status refers only to the state
of being married, single, divorced, or widowed absent statutory language
to the contrary.85 The identity of an individual's spouse is not considered
in these courts' analyses because inquiring into spousal identity would
effectively abolish employers' antinepotism or no-spouse rules.86 These
rules often survive if spousal identity is ignored because the employer
action, such as the refusal to hire an individual because the individual is
married to a current employee, is based on to whom the individual is
married, rather than on the individual's marital status.
87
For example, in Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp. ,88 the Michigan Supreme
Court analyzed an employer's policy that required relatives or spouses of
employees to quit, transfer, or be fired.89 The court held that marital sta-
tus should be interpreted narrowly and stated that the relevant inquiry is
whether an individual is married or not, rather than "to whom" one is
married.90  In finding that the policy did not violate the anti-
discrimination statute, the court reasoned that the statute's purpose is to
prevent employer prejudices or biases against members of a protected
class.91 Married individuals are considered to be a protected class.92 The
court found no instances of such prejudices or biases against married in-
dividuals that would justify special protection.9 3
82. See Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 382 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1977).
83. See Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc., v. N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 415
N.E.2d 950, 964 (N.Y. 1980); State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. Howarth v. Village of
Spencerport, 78 A.D.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
84. Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc., 415 N.E.2d at 950, 953.
85. See Whirlpool, 390 N.W.2d at 627; Miller, 362 N.W.2d at 654; Manhattan Pizza
Hut, Inc., 415 N.E.2d at 953.
86. See Miller, 362 N.W.2d at 654 (discussing the effect of marital status interpreta-
tion on antinepotism policies, stating that a broad interpretation would enlarge the pro-
tected class to include "all married persons who desire to work with their spouse").
87. Id. at 653.
88. Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1984).
89. Id. at 651.
90. Id. at 653.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 654.
93. Miller, 362 N.W.2d at 653-54.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Similarly, other state courts often uphold antinepotism or no spouse
policies by affording a narrow interpretation of marital status.94 In
Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express,95 the Superior Court of New Jer-
sey validated a company's no-spouse policy on the basis that the termi-
nation of an employee's wife was not based on her status of being mar-
ried.96 Rather, the court found that her termination resulted from her
relationship with another employee, who happened to be her husband.
97
Outside the realm of antinepotism and no-spouse rules, courts that
narrowly interpret marital status may still reject marital status discrimi-
nation claims on similar grounds. In State Division of Human Rights ex
rel. Howarth v. Village of Spencerport,98 for example, the New York
Appellate Division held that the employee's "status" must be the cause
of the employer's unlawful action.99 In Howarth, a discharged employee
claimed that she was discriminated against based on her marital status
when her employer discharged her because of her husband's involvement
in increasing property taxes in the town as a tax assessor.10 The court
conceded that the employee was terminated due to her husband's ac-
tions. °l The court found, however, that the plaintiff did not have a valid
claim because her marital status did not cause the termination; she would
have been discharged regardless of how she was linked to the tax asses-
sor.102 While narrow interpretation courts require that marital status be
the sole motivating factor for the adverse employment action, courts tak-
ing a broad view will look beyond the individual's status and consider
factors such as spousal identity, conduct, or beliefs.
10 3
2. Broad Interpretation
Hawaii, 10 4 Minnesota,10 5 and Montana,10 6 have all broadly interpret-
ed the term "marital status." These courts interpret marital status to
94. See Avelenda, supra note 1, at 710 (stating that no-spouse and antinepotism pol-
icies create more "subtle" forms of discrimination and therefore are supported by the nar-
row interpretation of marital status).
95. Thomson v. Sanbom's Motor Express, Inc., 382 A.2d 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 56.
98. State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. Howarth v. Village of Spencerport, 78
A.D.2d 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
99. Id. at 53.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 54.
102. Id.
103. See infra Part II.C.2.
104. See Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Haw. 1994).
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mean the condition of being married, unmarried, divorced, or widowed,
and will consider the identity of an individual's spouse.10 7 The rationale
for a broad interpretation stems from the idea that people do not marry in
the "generic sense."1°8 Rather, individuals marry a specific person' mak-
ing it impossible to separate the identity of one's spouse from one's
marital status.'0 9 Discrimination based on spousal attributes, such as oc-
cupation or beliefs, is therefore discrimination based on one's marital
status."'
Courts taking a broad view of the term marital status frequently dis-
cuss legislative intent to justify their interpretation.111 For example, in
Thompson v. Board of Trustees,"2 the Supreme Court of Montana rea-
soned that a broad interpretation is appropriate because the legislature's
objective in enacting the anti-discrimination statute was to combat dis-
crimination by encouraging employers to hire or terminate employees
based "solely on merit."' 13  Thompson involved a challenge to a no-
spouse rule, and the court further reasoned that a narrow interpretation
would be "absurd" because the couple could get around the rule and keep
their jobs by simply dissolving their marriage. 1
4
Like Montana, Minnesota also provides protection against marital
status discrimination and, compared to other states, offers the greatest
protection."15 Minnesota is the only state that broadly describes the term
"marital status" in its statute, stating that marital status includes "protec-
tion against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions,
or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse."'1 16 Further, for over 30 years,
Minnesota state courts have broadly interpreted marital status to include
the identity and actions of an employee's spouse.1 17 While Minnesota
courts originally required a "direct attack on the institution of marriage"
105. See Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979); Cybyske v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1984); Taylor v. LSI Corp. of Am., 796
N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 2011).
106. See Thompson v. Bd. Of Trs., Sch. Dist. No. 12, 627 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Mont.
1981).
107. Ross, 879 P.2d at 1041; Thompson, 627 P.2d at 1231; Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 389.
108. Ross, 879 P.2d at 1041.
109. Id.
110. Ross, 879 P.2d at 1041; Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 386, 388.
111. Thompson, 627 P.2d at 1231; Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 388.
112. Thompson v. Bd. OfTrs., Sch. Dist. No. 12, 627 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1981).
113. Id. at 1231.
114. Id.
115. See Humphress, supra note 65, at 927.
116. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(24) (West 2014).
117. See Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979).
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to have a valid claim for marital status discrimination,118 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota rejected the direct attack requirement in 2011.119
In Taylor v. LS1 Corporation of America,120 a terminated employee
alleged in her claim for marital status discrimination that she was fired
because the company felt it would be "awkward" keeping her as an em-
ployee after her husband had resigned as president of the company. 121 In
rejecting the direct attack requirement, the court looked to the Minnesota
statute's plain language, which stated that employers cannot ake adverse
action against an employee "because of ... marital status.,122 The court
found the statute's language unambiguous and rejected the notion that
adverse employer actions need to be "directed at the institution of mar-
riage."123 Rather, the court decided that the plaintiff was only required to
prove that the action was taken on the basis of marital status.1 2 4 The
court further reasoned that he claim was valid because the termination
was based on a change in the occupation of the employee's spouse, again
citing the language of the statute, which explicitly states that it is unlaw-
ful to discriminate on the basis of spousal identity.125 While the Minne-
sota court found support for a broad interpretation from the plain lan-
guage of their anti-discrimination statute, there is a general lack of clarity
as to how states will define and interpret he scope of marital status pro-
tection.
III. UNPREDICTABILITY, INCONSISTENCY, AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. The Need for Congressional Interpretation of Marital Status. A
Proposal for Title VII Protection
While states have been the primary forces behind protection against
marital status discrimination, that protection is still insufficient. Current-
ly, 29 states do not provide any redress for marital status discrimina-
tion.126 Among the states that do protect against marital status discrimi-
nation, there is wide variance in how to define marital status and the
118. See Cybyske v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1984)
(finding that no marital status discrimination occurred when a prospective employee was
not hired due to her spouse's political views because the discrimination was not a direct
attack on marriage).
119. See Taylor v. LSI Corp. of Am., 796 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 2011).
120. Taylor v. LSI Corp. of Am., 796 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2011).
121. Id. at 155.
122. Id. at 156.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Taylor, 796 N.W.2d at 156.
126. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
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proper scope of protection.127 The inconsistency in applying marital sta-
tus discrimination law has consequences for both employees and em-
ployers. 128 Protecting marital status through federal legislation would not
only solve these issues, but is also a logical step to take because marital
status as a proscribed basis for discrimination fits within Title VII's ob-
jectives and statutory scheme. 
129
1. Changing and Inconsistent Interpretations Call for a Uniform
Approach
Not only is there unpredictability as to one state's interpretation
compared to another, there also remains uncertainty as to how a single
state will choose to define marital status from year to year.'30 At least 3
of the 21 states that provide protection against marital status discrimina-
tion initially adopted one definition of the term marital status, only to lat-
er reverse and adopt the opposite interpretation.
131
Illinois, for example, originally broadly interpreted marital status,
but later narrowed its interpretation.13 2 Illinois courts initially held that
inquiries as to the identity of an individual's spouse fits within the scope
of marital status.133  Four years later, the Supreme Court of Illinois
changed course and held that marital status protection does not encom-
pass spousal identity.3 4  Currently, Illinois' statute complies with the
more recent narrow interpretation, defining marital status as the condi-
tion of "being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed."'35
127. See supra Part II.C.
128. See infra Part 111.2.
129. See supra Part 111.3.
130. See, e.g., River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Human Rights Comm'n,
597 N.E.2d 842, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Boaden v. Dep't of Law Enf't, 664 N.E.2d 61,
65 (Ill. 1996).
131. Hawaii, Illinois, and Washington adopted one interpretation and later adopted
the opposite view. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1 (West 2014) (defining marital status
narrowly); River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2, 597 N.E.2d at 846 (interpreting mari-
tal status broadly); Wash. Water Power Co. v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, 586
P.2d 1149, 1153 (Wash. 1978) (holding that marital status includes spousal identity). But
see Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Haw. 1994) (finding that marital
status should be interpreted broadly); Boaden, 664 N.E.2d at 65 (finding that an inquiry
into marital status discrimination does not encompass the identity of one's spouse);
Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 930 P.2d 307, 310 (Wash. 1997) (rejecting a broad
approach to marital status).
132. See River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2, 597 N.E.2d at 846 (recognizing mar-
ital status discrimination based on spousal identity). But see Boaden, 664 N.E.2d at 65
(finding that marital status discrimination does not encompass discrimination based on
spousal identity).
133. River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2, 597 N.E.2d at 842, 846.
134. Boaden, 664 N.E.2d at 61, 65.
135. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103 (West 2014).
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Conversely, some states have broadened the definition of marital
status through judicial opinion, despite guidance from the legislature on
the term's meaning.136 In Hawaii, for instance, the legislature narrowly
defined "marital status" in its statute to mean "the state of being married
or being single."137 The Supreme Court of Hawaii, however, has inter-
preted the statute broadly, holding that spousal identity is implicit in the
definition of marital status.1 38 This demonstrated variance in the scope of
marital status coverage state-to-state, and year-to-year in some states, has
proven to be problematic.
2. Changing and Inconsistent Interpretations of Marital Status Have
Far-reaching Implications
The inconsistency and unpredictability in protection and interpreta-
tion of the term "marital status" poses issues for both employees and em-
ployers. A uniform approach as to the coverage and meaning of marital
status is necessary in a day and age where employees may live in one
state and commute to another for work,139 and employers may have of-
fices in multiple states.140 Federal guidance will provide clear expecta-
tions for employees and employers and solve some of the existing issues
caused by the current state of marital status discrimination.
a. Issues Affecting Employees
Employees will better be able to protect themselves if Congress
speaks on the issue of the proper scope of marital status protection. The
most obvious and problematic issue employees face due to the lack of
federal protection against marital status discrimination is that employees
in 29 states are left without recourse against marital status discrimination
in the workplace.141 The absence of federal protection for marital status
often forces litigants to bring an alternative claim under Title VII in fed-
eral court, which is often unsuccessful.142 Not only do plaintiffs have
136. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 378-1; Ross, 879 P.2d at 1041.
137. HAw. REV. STAT. § 378-1.
138. See Ross, 879 P.2d at 1041.
139. A study released in 2013 by the United States Census Bureau found that 3.8 per-
cent of American workers, amounting to approximately 5.2 million people, work outside
their state of residence. See Brian McKenzie, Out-of-State and Long Commutes: 2011,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 8 (Feb. 2013),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/commuting/files/2012/ACS-20.pdf.
140. See Claire Harrison, Best Practices For Multistate Employers, LAw360 (Feb. 18,
2009), http://www. dykema.com/media/publication/3 1Multistate / 20Employers.pdf.
141. Currently, 29 states have not included marital status as a proscribed basis for un-
lawful discrimination. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
142. See Porter, supra note 30, at 7.
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low rates of success when challenging antinepotism or no-spouse poli-
cies, 1 43 but a favorable outcome is largely dependent on the litigant being
female.'44
For example, a female applicant who was denied employment be-
cause her husband already worked for the employer may choose to chal-
lenge the no-spouse policy in federal court by claiming that the policy
has a disparate impact on females.145 No-spouse rules have an adverse
effect on women because women historically enter the workplace on a
permanent basis later than men, and commonly have lower salaries than
men, making resignation by the woman less financially harmful to a cou-
ple faced with a no-spouse policy.146 Because evidence suggests that no-
spouse policies have a disproportionate effect on females, it is likely that
a female's claim would stand a chance for success.
147
Conversely, if the plaintiff were a male whose wife was already
employed by the company, his claim would likely fail due to the lack of
evidence that the no-spouse policy disproportionately affects males.
148
The absence of federal safeguards against marital status discrimination
therefore not only precludes individuals from recovery if the individual
lives in one of the 29 states that fails to protect marital status, but it also
results in inequitable treatment towards male plaintiffs. Because males
do not have the same opportunity as females to claim sex discrimination
when the action is more appropriately categorized as marital status dis-
crimination, federal protection of marital status would provide male
plaintiffs with a chance for redress.
b. Issues Affecting Employers
While federal coverage of marital status may appear to provide add-
ed protection solely for employees, federal protection of marital status
discrimination will also provide additional safeguards for employers.
For example, some of the typical defenses to Title VII claims can apply
to marital status discrimination claims, such as the bona fide occupation-
143. See Chandler et al., supra note 18, at 44.
144. See id. at 35, 47 (discussing the increased likelihood of a woman successfully
claiming sex discrimination when adverse employer action is based on her marital status).
145. See id
146. Porter, supra note 30, at 29-30.
147. No-spouse rules have commonly been found to negatively impact women. See
Wexler, supra note 26, at 79 (discussing both the direct and subtle negative effects of no-
spouse policies on women); Chandler et al., supra note 18, at 42--43 (finding that 71%
of plaintiffs challenging no-spouse or antinepotism rules were female).
148. While no-spouse or antinepotism rules have the capacity to adversely impact
men, there is a much greater likelihood of the policies adversely impacting women. See
Wexler, supra note 26, at 79; Chandler et al., supra note 18, at 45.
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al defense,49 as it does for most other protected categories. Federal guid-
ance will not only provide a statutory defense for employers against
claims of marital status discrimination, but will also alleviate issues af-
fecting multi-state employers due to the unclear state of marital status
discrimination law.1
50
For example, multi-state employers currently face the possibility of
being held liable for unlawful discrimination in one state and not in an-
other, even if the claim and adverse action were identical, such as a chal-
lenge to a company-wide policy.151 As a result, employment experts
have suggested a number of policies that multi-state employers can im-
plement to avoid liability. 152 One commentator has advised multi-state
employers to completely refrain from implementing a company-wide
policy that may potentially be challenged as effecting marital status dis-
crimination.'53 The commentator reasons that the employer may be safe
to implement a policy in one state, where there is no protection against
marital status discrimination or because the state provides narrow cover-
age.'54 Yet, in another state where the employer operates, the same poli-
cy may result in liability because that state has taken a broad approach or
has proven to inconsistently interpret marital status.155 Another commen-
tator has suggested that multi-state employers should consult with coun-
sel prior to making any employment decision because an action may ex-
pose that employer to liability for marital status discrimination in one
state, while the same action would not lead to similar litigation in a
neighboring state.
56
Although these suggestions are considered to be the "best practice,"
to avoid liability, executing these strategies is likely impractical.'57
There is evidence that employers favor antinepotism policies, largely be-
cause such policies aim to prevent personal relationships from interfering
with employee productivity.58 Therefore, employers will likely choose
to run the risk of liability by implementing or refusing to amend antinep-
149. See infra Part III.B.
150. See Julius M. Steiner & Steven P. Steinberg, Caught Between Scylla and Cha-
rybdis: Are Antinepotism Policies Benign Paternalism or Covert Discrimination?, 20
EMP. REL. L.J. 253, 262 (1994) (discussing the issues facing multi-state employers due to
the "conflicting statutory interpretations" of marital status).
151. Id.
152. See e.g., Steiner, supra note 144, at 262-64; Harrison, supra note 134.
153. Steiner, supra note 144, at 262.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Harrison, supra note 134.
157. Id.
158. See Avelenda, supra note 1, at 698 (discussing the steady growth of antinepotism
policies in corporate America since the 1970s).
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otism policies.59 Additionally, requiring employers to consult counsel
before making any employment decision at all, including hiring, promot-
ing, and terminating, could be a costly and administratively inefficient
undertaking.
3. Marital Status Discrimination Fits Within Title VII's Objectives
and Statutory Scheme
Title VII requires an employer to make employment decisions based
on an individual's qualifications or job performance and protects against
arbitrary employer actions based on stereotypical generalizations of a
particular characteristic an individual possesses.60 These generalizations
are commonly known as "invidious assumptions."'16' Accordingly, in-
cluding marital status as a proscribed basis for unlawful discrimination is
a logical addition to Title VII because claims for marital status discrimi-
nation often arise when an employer makes a generalization of an em-
ployee on the basis of their marital status.162 Adding marital status pro-
tection will also serve to foster Title VII's established interests because
of the close relationship marital status discrimination has with sex dis-
crimination, a protected category under Title VII. 63 Finally, states cur-
rently treat marital status discrimination as if marital status is already
federally protected.'64 States not only model marital status discrimina-
tion legislation after Title VII, but state courts also apply Title VII pro-
cedural framework to marital status discrimination claims. 
165
a. Marital Status Discrimination Involves "Invidious Assumptions"
Congress chose to protect race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin under Title VII because discrimination based on these classifica-
tions involves invidious assumptions and prejudices.166 Like the catego-
ries currently protected under Title VII, discrimination based on marital
status usually involves similar "invidious assumptions."'' 67 For example,
employers often create no-spouse rules assuming how a married couple
159. See Steiner, supra note 144, at 262-64.
160. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
161. Id.
162. See infra Part III.A.3.a.
163. See infra Part III.A.3.b.
164. See infra Part III.A.3.c.
165. See infra Part III.A.3.c.
166. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that Congress
sought to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers ... when the barriers op-
erate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifica-
tion").
167. See Giattina, supra note 53, at 1125-26.
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may work together, rather than based on observations or actual problems
that have arisen in the workplace.168 The justification for no-spouse
rules-that such a rule prevents personal problems from infiltrating the
workplace-assumes that all married couples cannot work productively
together and does not give any consideration to an individual's qualifica-
tions or job performance. 169
Regardless of the fact that marital status involves invidious assump-
tions, like the traits currently protected under Title VII, those opposed to
Title VII protection of marital status would likely argue that marital sta-
tus does not deserve protection because it is not an immutable character-
istic. 170 An immutable characteristic is defined as a characteristic that is
"beyond the power of an individual to change.'' 171 However, Title VII
does not require that the basis for discrimination feature an immutable
characteristic. 17 A useful comparison can be made between marital sta-
tus and religion, a protected category under Title VII. 173 Religion has
similar properties to marital status in that one's religion can seemingly be
changed just as easily as one's marital status.174 Despite the fact that
one's religion is not an immutable trait, Congress nevertheless opted to
protect religion as an unlawful basis for discrimination.175 Therefore, a
lack of immutability has not proven to be a barrier to Title VII protection
and marital status could be similarly protected under the statute.176
Further, critics may argue that marital status discrimination is simp-
ly not severe or prevalent enough to rise to a level requiring Title VII
protection.77 However, while most marital status discrimination claims
involve no-spouse and antinepotism rules, other marital status discrimi-
nation claims involve more reprehensible employer action. 178 For exam-
ple, an employee who is fired because his employer found out that he
was living with his girlfriend out of wedlock exemplifies arbitrary em-
ployer action based solely on the employer's disagreement with personal
marital decisions of his employee.179 In another case, an employee was
168. Id.
169. Wexler, supra note 26, at 78.
170. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (stating that sex is a rec-
ognized suspect class due to its immutable nature).
171. In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211,233 (B.I.A 1985).
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (including religion as a protected class, a
characteristic that can be changed).
173. Id.
174. Porter, supra note 30, at 27-28.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
176. Id.
177. Porter, supra note 30, at 28.
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fired because of his pending divorce, a similar example of employer dis-
agreement with an employee's marital decision.
180 The impact of marital
status discrimination is likely sufficiently pervasive when considering
these types of egregious claims, in addition to the popularity of no-
spouse and antinepotism policies.18
1 Inclusion of marital status as a pro-
tected class under Title VII would not only further the statute's goal of
preventing arbitrary employment actions, but would also further other
interests of Title VII.
b. The Addition of Marital Status Would Further the Interests Title
VII Serves to Protect
Most notably, marital status discrimination is inevitably intertwined
with sex discrimination.182 No-spouse and antinepotism rules, while fa-
cially sex-neutral, have a disproportionate effect on women.
183 When a
couple is faced with a no-spouse rule requiring denial of employment or
resignation for one spouse, there is a greater likelihood that the woman
will be the one who is denied employment 
or resigns.' 84
While a woman may choose to challenge a no-spouse policy as sex
discrimination under Title VII, proving a disproportionate effect on fe-
males is difficult, in part because no-spouse rules implicate discrimina-
tion based on marital status more so than discrimination 
based on sex.'85
Including marital status would present an alternate, and likely more ap-
propriate, theory of recovery for women challenging 
no-spouse rules.
186
Adding marital status as a protected category under Title VII would
complement the protection of sex discrimination and thereby further the
interests of Title VII.
c. Many States Already Apply Title VII's Framework to Marital
Status Discrimination Claims
Many state legislatures have chosen similar wording to Title VII in
their statutes protecting against marital status discrimination.
1 87 Several
state courts have also described their respective anti-discrimination stat-
180. Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, No. A-1717-12T3, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 1548, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
181. The pervasiveness of marital status discrimination is likely unknown and un-
derreported given the lack of protection in federal court and many state courts. Thus, its
prevalence may actually be greater. See supra Part II.B.
182. See supra Part II.B.1.
183. Wexler, supra note 26, at 92.
184. See id.; Porter, supra note 30, at 29-30.
185. See supra Part I.C.1.
186. Porter, supra note 30, at 33.
187. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
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utes as having the same or similar objectives as Title VII's. 188 Despite
the current lack of protection for marital status under Title VII, state
courts apply the same procedural framework and rules of Title VII ac-
tions to state marital status discrimination claims. 89 A plaintiff in state
court claiming marital status discrimination can submit his or her claim
under either of the traditional Title VII theories of disparate impact or
disparate treatment.190
State courts will also use the federal burden-shifting framework to
determine whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie claim of discrim-
ination before shifting the burden to the employer to articulate a neutral
reason for the action.19' Furthermore, some state legislatures and state
courts will recognize the Title VII employer defenses of business neces-
sity and bona fide occupational qualification in state marital status dis-
crimination claims.192 Because states already model their marital status
discrimination treatment after Title VII, an amendment to Title VII in-
cluding marital status as a proscribed basis would not require states to
alter their procedure. Federal protection against marital status discrimi-
nation would provide a much-needed uniform interpretation of marital
status and alleviate many issues created by the inconsistency and unpre-
dictability of the scope of marital status protection among the states. 193
B. Crafting a Title VIIAmendment
The most appropriate way for Congress to address marital status
discrimination would be to amend Title VII to include marital status as
an unlawful basis for discrimination.194 Of course, amending Title VII to
include additional categories of unlawful discrimination places more re-
sponsibility on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
188. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Civil Rights Conm'n, 390 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Mich.
1986) (stating that Michigan's civil rights act's purpose is to prevent discrimination based
on "stereotyped impressions"); Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979)
(stating that Minnesota's anti-discrimination legislation aimed to "outlaw arbitrary classi-
fications relating to marriage").
189. Humphress, supra note 65, at 925.
190. See, e.g., Farmington Educ. Ass'n v. Farmington Sch. Dist., 351 N.W.2d 242,
245 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
191. See, e.g., Slohoda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 504 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986).
192. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 2014); Wash. Water Power Co. v. Wash.
State Human Rights Comm'n, 586 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Wash. 1978); Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at
388.
193. See supra Part Ill.A.1.
194. See Dennis Aldering, The Family That Works Together... Can't: No-Spouse
Rules as Marital Status Discrimination Under State and Federal Law, 32 U. LOUISVILLE
J. FAM. L. 867, 883 (1994).
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(EEOC), which handles initial employment discrimination complaints.
195
However, because an amendment to Title VII protecting against marital
status discrimination is necessary and consistent with the goals of Title
VII, such an amendment should be enacted despite the added burden
placed on the EEOC. 196
Moreover, if Congress were to amend Title VII to add marital status
as a protected classification, additional clarifications would be needed in
order to avoid the pitfalls of the current state-directed system of marital
status protection.197 For instance, the scope of marital status protection
should be clearly defined in the statute in order to avoid running into the
same inconsistency problems that presently exist among the states.
198
Further, employers should be able to assert the bona fide occupational
qualification to ensure that employers can exercise legitimate business
decisions that otherwise may be construed as marital status discrimina-
tion.199
There are several ways that Title VII can be amended to include
marital status as an unlawful basis for discrimination.200 Amending Title
VII to include marital status as unlawful discrimination can be accom-
plished by including it as a division of another protected category, such
as sex. 20  Alternatively, marital status can be added as its own separate
category for unlawful discrimination.2 °2 The mode of amending Title
VII is not as important as ensuring that marital status is clearly defined
somewhere in the text to avoid the issues of unpredictability and incon-
sistency the states are currently facing.20 3
1. The Rationale for a Broad Statutory Definition
The definition of marital status included in a Title VII amendment
should be broad enough to encompass spousal attributes, including the
195. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(6), 2000e-5(f)(l) (2012). In 2014, the EEOC re-
ceived 88,778 total charges of discrimination based on the protected grounds of Title V11,
retaliation, age, disability, violations of the Equal Pay Act, and violations of The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA). Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through
FY 2014, U.S. EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/ statistics/enforcement/charges.cfin. The total
charges would presumably increase should an additional ground for discrimination be
added to Title VII.
196. Porter, supra note 30, at 23.
197. See infra Part III.B.1.
198. See infra Part III.B.2.
199. See infra Part III.B.3.
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k); id. § 2000e-2(a).
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (amending Title VII to include discrimination based
on pregnancy as unlawful sex-based discrimination).
202. See id. § 2000e-2(a).
203. See supra Part III.A.
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identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse.204 While only a minori-
ty of states have adopted a comprehensive interpretation of the term,
broadly defining marital status would better aid in eliminating the ad-
verse employment actions anti-discrimination laws set out to combat.205
Specifically, a broad definition would allow individuals to challenge ar-
bitrary no-spouse rules that allow employers to make decisions based on
factors wholly unrelated to the individual's qualifications or job perfor-
mance.
206
Additionally, because marital status discrimination extends beyond
no-spouse rules, a broad definition would better protect employees from
egregious employer actions taken simply because the employer disagrees
with the employee's personal marital decisions.0 7 Though these types of
claims are less common, they represent the need for broad protection be-
cause employers often attempt to argue that marital status is not impli-
cated if the action was not taken based on the employee's status as mar-
ried, unmarried, or single.208 Because courts would have to consider the
identity of one's spouse, there would be more cases heard by courts that
involve these egregious types of claims, and therefore, a greater likeli-
hood that victims of discrimination will seek and obtain redress.2 9 An
amendment with a broad definition will provide employees with signifi-
cant protection, and the amendment will also ensure that employers are
able to make necessary business decisions without implicating marital
status discrimination.
2. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense
While federal coverage of marital status favors protection of em-
ployees, an amendment to Title VII would provide employers the oppor-
tunity to defend against discrimination claims by asserting the bona fide
occupational qualification defense.2 10 The bona fide occupational quali-
fication defense is available for disparate treatment claims under Title
VII.211 If a plaintiff proves disparate treatment based on religion, sex, or
national origin, an employer may assert that the adverse action was taken
as a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
204. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 353A.03(24) (WEST 2014).
205. See supra Part II.D.2.
206. See supra Part II.D.2.
207. See supra Part III.B. 1.
208. See supra Part II.D.1.
209. See e.g., Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Haw. 1994); Thomp-
son v. Bd. of Trs., Sch. Dist. No. 12, 627 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Mont. 1981); Kraft, Inc. v.
State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)(2012).
211. Id.
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normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.,
212 Essential-
ly, discrimination that would ordinarily be unlawful is lawful if the em-
ployer can prove that the employment decision is justified despite having
a discriminatory impact.213
While the Court warned that the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion defense should be applied narrowly,214 it is logical to extend the
availability of the defense to marital status claims. The legislative histo-
ry of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shows that the defense was originally
suggested to apply to all five categories of Title VII, including race and
color.215 The suggestion was rejected, not because of a stated concern of
over-inclusion, but because there were simply no circumstances under
which the legislature would excuse adverse employer action on the basis
of race and color.2 16 Unlike race and color discrimination, there are plau-
sible circumstances under which employers should be afforded the op-
portunity to assert the defense against a marital discrimination claim,
such as defending an employer policy that prohibits one spouse from par-
ticipating in compensation or promotion decisions involving the other
spouse.217 This safeguard for employers provides balance to the wide-
spread protection that a Title VII amendment will grant to employees.
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, 21 states prohibit unlawful discrimination on the basis of
marital status. The definition and scope of marital status discrimination
has proven to be inconsistent and unpredictable when left to the states to
interpret. States are split on whether marital status should be afforded a
narrow or broad interpretation. The varying protections afforded under
the current state-dominated system obviate the need for Congressional
action amending Title VII to add marital status as a protected category
and broadly defining the term.
Federal guidance is necessary to protect both employees and em-
ployers from the adverse effects of marital status discrimination. An
amendment to Title VII is vital to safeguard those individuals who cur-
rently have no redress against marital status discrimination in the work-
212. Id.
213. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334, 336 (1977) (holding that sex is a
bona fide occupational qualification when an all-male maximum security prison did not
hire a female prison guard because many of the inmates had been convicted of sex crimes
and female guards were perceived as more vulnerable to attack than male guards).
214. Id. at 334.
215. Jean Fielding, Discrimination Law-Impermissible Use of the Business Necessity
Defense and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 12 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 135,
141 (1990).
216. Id.
217. Porter, supra note 30, at 47.
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place, including those discriminated against under no-spouse or antinep-
otism rules and those victimized by egregious employer actions. Such an
amendment will also further the interests of Title VII, particularly by
limiting the adverse impact no-spouse policies have on female employ-
ees. Adding marital status as an unlawful basis for discrimination will
provide a uniform definition and clear expectations for both employees
and employers on what conduct constitutes marital status discrimination.
